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Abstract
In an attempt to better understand where foreign aid is most effective for developmental
purposes and poverty alleviation, this study takes a focused look at the correlation
between democracy and corruption. High democratization is tested alongside corruption
in foreign aid usage to determine if an inverse relationship exists. The implication is then
that low levels of foreign aid corruption will be tied to increased effectiveness of
development interventions. This increased effectiveness will then result in an increase of
overall development. The research examines three African countries – Ghana, Zambia,
Swaziland – through comparative case studies to test the democratic institutions and
values that create a mechanism through which corruption is stopped, including the proper
ministries and agencies to increase accountability as well as elections and open press for
transparency. Understanding the necessary but not sufficient role democracy plays in
impeding corruption can then help create conditionalities for foreign aid moving forward.
Introduction
The aid industry has been a largely controversial part of the international
community, especially when foreign aid given for developmental purposes has not
produced the levels of poverty alleviation strongly sought after and expected. One
question is whether aid in its entirety, or in any capacity, can directly cause development
to occur or whether a large aid influx hinders growth. Different fields of thought from
William Easterly’s rejection of all forms of intervention to Jeffrey Sach’s call for
dramatic aid increase by donor countries to Banerjee and Duflo’s middle ground of
foreign intervention at the margin have been considered and contested. Regardless of the
approach, however, it remains true that developing countries under the current aid system
have seen unimpressive results, “Although there are exceptions to the generalization that
foreign aid has failed by and large the recipients of foreign aid have not improved the
quality of life of their citizens and for many the quality of life has declined”1.
The purpose of this research is to look at what circumstances might deem aid
more developmentally beneficial, if such instances exist, and if donors are able to cater to
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these circumstances when giving international assistance. Looking back at the history of
foreign aid from its beginning stages post-World War II through the implementation of
the Marshall Plan in 1948, aid has largely been tied to conditionality, in that recipient
governments were expected to adopt certain policies or reform current policy if aid was
to be given. During the onset of the Cold War, recipients of the Marshall Plan were
required to adopt free-market policies2. After this initial donation to recipient countries,
the success seen in the growth of Western European economies was attributed to the
money presented by the Plan and a model for formal foreign aid was established.
However, even though the world today heavily utilizes the aid industry, there is no
dramatic improvement in the quality of life for developing countries. While tied aid or
the conditionality of aid, like that of the Marshall Plan, exists, aid is widely given to
varying regime types and leaders that cannot be defined as fully democratic or liberal.
For example Swaziland, one of the last absolute monarchies in the world, received about
85.9 USD million in official development assistance for 20143. The purpose of this study
is to understand the effectiveness of foreign aid for development purposes dependent on
varying regime types and to understand the policy implications this may hold.
Determining whether aid given to certain regime types is more effective for development
than to others could have major policy consequences for aid recipients and donors alike.
The objective of this research is to determine whether a causal relationship exists
between levels of democracy within a recipient country and the amount by which foreign
aid is effectively utilized. Therefore, a comparative case study was conducted in an
2
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attempt to trace causality, if any causality exists. Given the multidimensional nature of
the argument on foreign aid effectiveness, searching for proper measures of foreign aid
distribution must begin on a more narrowly defined level. This study focuses closely on
how the relationship between elites and constituents with regard to corruption can have
an affect on the utilization of foreign aid.
The relationship in question is that of a sovereignty contract between
governments and their promise to provide for their constituents. Sovereignty contracts are
formed as the bedrock of governmental institutions – allowing a greater body to protect
and provide for citizens in return for some form of payment and authority. Without the
presence of a strong contract, and with recipient governments continually catering to
donors or country elites, the constituents’ needs could be largely forgotten. Aid given for
development purposes could then be ineffective if the government does not feel the need
to support their citizens. Corruption, or the siphoning of aid for private gains, could
become the reality of donor-recipient relationships. What results from a loss of
sovereignty contract between the government and constituents is a situation of aid
dependency:
Furthermore, the pervasive culture of aid dependency makes it near impossible for
Africans to hold their governments to account for failing to provide the basic
requirements to enable food production, and to penalize them for bad behaviors
such as corruption.4
Loss of public goods is specifically a consequence of aid dependency – resulting in
health, education, infrastructure, and national security sectors taking hits to productivity
and general improvement5. Through the misuse of funds and a lack of concern for
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constituent needs and interests, large aid inflows do not contribute to the overall
development of the population.
Research Question
The question then becomes – for countries at similar levels of development, can
democracy limit elite capture of foreign aid funds? To understand under what types of
environments foreign aid is distributed most effectively and should or should not be
delivered for development purposes must come from an understanding of the type of
government in the recipient country. This question identifies the variables to be measured
that provide a more structured and focused analysis. The dependent variable is the elite
capture of foreign aid funds, particularly emphasizing the misuse of funds for corrupt
purposes within the recipient governments, including all senior and high-level officials.
The independent variable is the level of democracy within the recipient government
based on factors determined from the literature on democracy and development. The
controlled variables include level of development, geographic region, and colonial history
of each recipient government.
Literature Review
Understanding corruption in the context of elite misuse requires a look at grand
corruption specifically. This is defined as corruption that “occurs at the highest levels of
government and involves major government projects and programs”6. Corruption by
these high level officials oftentimes results in less money spent on infrastructure and
maintenance of the public sector. Public investments that are made are done so without
real impact or development prospects. On the contrary, “capital-intensive projects” such
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as construction projects are more often pursued and the money easily siphoned for
ineffective means, “Corrupt officials distort public sector choices to generate large rents
for themselves and to produce inefficient and inequitable public policies”7. The desire of
politicians to be reelected dictates their pursuance of certain projects and investments –
the need to remain in office dominates their rationale. With this in mind, anti-corruption
strategies must then include incentivization of politicians to provide public gains that
matter rather than superficial public investments, education to better equip voters with
knowledge of this process, and institutional changes to create stability that decrease the
incentive for politicians to seek immediate, private benefit. All these measures shift focus
from the short-term to the long-term, extending stability within the government.
The logic of elites attempting to accrue private benefit from public provisions is
supported by selectorate theory. This theory of strategic action explains that the decisions
made by the selectorate, or those who take part in the choosing of a leader, are largely
influenced by the size of the winning coalition, or the subgroup whose support dictates
whether the leader stays in office or not. Democracies hold larger winning coalitions and
larger selectorates while autocracies have smaller winning coalitions, “As the size of the
winning coalition increases, leaders shift that mix away from the provision of private
benefits and towards the provision of public goods”8. Aid, a benefit for the recipient
government, then becomes an instrument manipulated by the interest of the leaders.
When the leaders in a larger coalition government cater more toward their constituents as
a whole, the aid is disseminated across a larger range of the polity. Examining the
distribution of foreign aid for specific types of governments through a look at selectorate
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theory allows for the relationship between governments and their constituents to be
considered in light of rationality and self-interest, “It clarifies why aid is more welcome
by petty dictators than by their subjects and why aid hinders democratization rather than
promotes it”9. Private gain of a smaller winning coalition means aid will not be
disseminated to a wider population. Democracy in this sense requires that the winning
coalition be won over by more public goods and benefits, thereby ensuring the leaders
maintain their position in office. The idea here is that more people must be appeased in
democracy for the leader to stay in power, an idea Lipset explains through the strong
presence of a middle class.
For Lipset, development creates a larger middle class, which moderates extremists
through a middle class desire to maintain the amount of wealth they currently hold.
Larger class distinctions result in greater pressures and differences between members of
society, which in turn can generate greater instability and potential for elites to be thrown
out of power. A larger middle class then inevitably generates democratization for a
society. Lipset defines democracy as, “a political system that supplies regular
constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials”10. Within democracy,
there exist certain conditions where the political system develop including the existence
of a belief system, political leaders, and out of office leaders that act as opposition to the
leaders in office. These are the specific values and institutions that allow democracy to
persist in and of itself, without which absolutism and maximized authority of leaders
would exist. For Lipset specifically, the argument is that, “the more well-to-do a nation,
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the greater chances that it will sustain democracy”11. The democratic political system is
then looked at through its relation to legitimacy and economic development.
Socioeconomic development results through four factors – industrialization, urbanization,
the education of citizens, and wealth generation – that result in a more sustainable
democratic system.
The literature on corruption is largely dominated by the belief that development
represents the causal mechanism by which corruption is or is not prevalent within a
society. Treisman specifically believes the robustness of data surrounding corruption and
economic development is this explanatory variable. While certain characteristics of
corrupt societies exist, they have not presented strong enough linkages to explain
corruption. For example, “We now know that states are perceived by business people and
their citizens to be less corrupt if they are highly developed, long-established liberal
democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government,
and a long record of openness to international trade”12. On the opposite side, countries are
more corrupt if they “depend on fuel exports, have intrusive business regulations, and
suffer from unpredictable inflation”13. However, across different measures and studies,
the data is inconsistent.
The literature on corruption stops at development as the causal mechanism. While
the literature is becoming richer, corruption data is not entirely reliable for a number of
reasons: Treisman explains that corruption is entirely defined and determined by
perceptions – both cultural and individual standards for how corruption does or does not
Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” 75.
Daniel Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption From Ten Years of CrossNational Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 241.
13
Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption From Ten Years of Cross-National
Empirical Research?” 241.
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present itself, and how interactions between individuals or groups work in certain
contexts. “Comparability across surveys” as well as “comparability of responses across
countries” are major concerns faced in corruption studies with the potential to distort
findings14. This allows room for biases and misconceptions surrounding interactions,
which is largely problematic when researchers attempt to use these perceptions of
corruption to make determinations regarding democracy, equality, and other social or
institutional features of government.
With these inconsistencies in mind, the causal mechanism for corruption may not
simply be development. Another widespread explanation looks at “good governance” or
how democratic a country is. The correlation may be that with higher levels of
democracy, corruption levels decrease. Other corruption literature, such as Mark Warren,
looks at what he labels, “corruption as duplicitous exclusion”, or the idea that corruption
and the democratic political process have a harmful relationship with each other when
exclusion or secrecy within the democratic institutions exists, which is a more narrow
focus on some aspects of Ackerman’s argument15. While the connection between
democratic ways and good governance is one that Warren supports, corruption becomes a
way democracy can take a downward turn. He examines typical institutions of democracy
including “voting, engaging in public discourse and judgments, organizing and joining
within civil society organizations, and decentralized/deconcentrated political power” that
constitute inclusion within government16. With the potential for corruption to ruin
democratic institutions, anti-corruption acts as a means of democratic empowerment.
Several mechanisms exist by which democracy as a set of institutions can mitigate
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corrupt practices. These include the existence of personal freedoms and the ability of rule
of law to maintain these freedoms, delineated into certain societal norms and institutions.
The questions to be asked in the analysis of corruption revolve around these two aspects
of governance and frameworks that exist.
The presence of these frameworks can also dictate the level of democracy within
a government. Levitsky and Way break apart how democratic a government can be,
“Different mixes of authoritarian and democratic features have distinct historical roots,
and they may have different implications for economic performance, human rights, and
the prospects for democracy”17. The authors specifically examine competitive
authoritarianism, characterized by upholding democratic institutions. However,
“incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent… that the regime fails to
meet conventional minimum standards for democracy”18. This being the case,
competitive authoritarian governments fail to uphold four minimum criteria for
democracies. These include open, free, and fair elections; universal suffrage; protection
of political rights and civil liberties; and authority of elected officials to govern. The
ways in which these failures exist, however, are largely presented in more subtle forms of
violation such as “bribery, co-optation, and various forms of persecution”19. Yet, the
existence of the democratic institutions, while still being flawed, hinders outright
persecution as seen in full-scale authoritarianism. Four areas of democratic contestation –
the electoral arena, the legislative arena, the judiciary, and the media – allow for autocrats
and flawed democratic institutions to be challenged, “The presence of elections,

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy
13 (2002): 52.
18
Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 52.
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Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 59.
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legislatures, courts, and an independent media creates periodic opportunities for
challenges by opposition forces”20.
For Alexander and Welzel, the varying levels of democracy are dependent on the
capacity for the state to implement the rule of law. The authors define democracy as
literally government for the people, thereby requiring that democracy empower the
people as a primary requirement. The empowerment of people is done by, “… two forms
of freedom: the freedom to follow their [the people’s] personal preferences in their
private lives and the freedom to make their political preferences count in public life”21.
This is done through the use of certain institutions such as political pluralism or
independent judiciaries that allow for popular rights to be used effectively. The practice
of rule of law to guarantee popular rights essentially defines what constitutes an effective
versus nominal democracy. When popular rights are given, but the rule of law is not
instituted, nominal democracy results. In contrast, when popular rights are given and rule
of law is instituted, effective democracy results. The ability to exercise democracy is then
shown to be rooted in socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts – greater development
and distribution of resources results in an increased ability to participate in politics and
popular rights. In this case, the literature effectively incorporates development within the
context of increased democratic levels thereby resulting in lower levels of corruption.
Treisman supports this sort of pattern as well.
Understanding the institutions that qualify the presence of democracy makes
understanding the resulting corruption that can occur more evident. Susan Rose
Ackerman writes that incentives for corruption to arise within democracies “depend on
Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 59.
Amy C. Alexander and Christian Welzel, “Measuring Effective Democracy: The Human Empowerment
Approach,” Comparative Politics 43 (2011): 273.
20
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the organization of electoral and legislative processes” as well as “method of campaign
finance”22. Corruption is directly tied to political structures and their connection with
private wealth. Ackerman identifies three dimensions by which corruption occurs –
through the ability of politicians to receive private gains, how legal this process is, and
the strength of political relationships in this context23.
Hypothesis
Given the aforementioned literature on democracy and corruption, it can be
predicted that as levels of democracy increase, corrupt uses of foreign aid will decrease.
Therefore, the lower levels of corruption correlate with the level of democratic
institutions, political rights, and civil liberties present within a society. The presence of
these mechanisms within society is what ultimately determine the strength of the social
contract between governments and their constituents. Stronger commitment to democratic
institutions and values creates more accountability from the government to provide for
their citizens with public goods. With a broken commitment by elites to their
constituents, grand corruption becomes more likely.
The hypotheses gleaned from this discussion are as follows – First, levels of
corruption in foreign aid usage will correlate with the levels of democracy within the
country, the two being inversely related. Secondly, low levels of foreign aid corruption
result in increased effectiveness of development interventions. Finally as a concluding
hypothesis, increased effectiveness of these interventions leads to an increase in overall
development. For this research in particular, only the initial hypothesis relating to
corruption and democracy levels will be investigated. This salient hypothesis is required

22
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to decipher if the independent variable, that is the level of democracy, is a necessary and
sufficient condition for overall aid effectiveness.
While some parts of the literature say corruption levels are dependent on the level
of development, this study attempts to determine that another cause may exist as
mentioned above– that is, the level of democracy or presence of democratic institutions
within the country creates the path for corruption to manifest or not. It is predicted that
there are certain measures within government, in the form of institutions, which limit
corruption. These institutions act as an accountability measure for the government’s
commitment to the needs of its citizens, thereby enforcing the social contract. Since
foreign aid is a public good to be allocated for development, there needs to exist specific
institutions that cater to tracking foreign aid inflow and distribution. These can include
the ability of citizens to hold their governments accountable through anti-corruption
enforcement and elections; the presence of independent portions of government to hold
the central government to commitments; and the availability of information to citizens.
Variables
The independent variable for this research is the level of democracy within each
specified country. The difference between these levels of democracy will be determined
by the Freedom House measures, a significant tool to understand the realization of
political rights and civil liberties. This measure is particularly important since it focuses
on individuals, rather than the governments, and the implementation of policy to promote
democratic values – Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report, “assesses the realworld rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or
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government performance per se”24. The distinction in these measurements is that
democratic policy, while it may exist, is not always effectively implemented. While
perhaps being democratic in the name, the adherence to democratic institutions and
norms is highly uneven from country to country. Therefore, the research will look at
adherence to democratic institutions through Freedom House. Based upon a rating scale
of one to seven in either political rights or civil liberties, Freedom House generates an
average of the score and assigns the country within the categories of Free (1.0 to 2.5),
Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). When establishing the measures,
Freedom House uses a scale of ten different political rights indicators including the
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning government.
Fifteen civil liberties indicators include freedom of expression and belief, associational
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.
The dependent variable for this study is the level of capture or corrupt usage of
foreign aid funds. Corruption in itself is a wildly challenging aspect of society to measure
for several reasons previously touched upon. While certain ways of measuring corruption
exist such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, it is important
to note that this index specifically takes into account varying perceptions and standards
for governmental behavior. It is acknowledged that a wide spectrum of what constitutes
corruption within different sectors can lead to a lack of richness in measurements25. This
being the case, the measurements based on the Index include a general score of
corruption ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (clean) as well as a ranking of the 175

“Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, accessed January 31, 2016,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014.
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countries for which there is data available, with Denmark ranking first as the most clean
and Somalia and North Korea ranked last as the most corrupt. The countries are likewise
given a score from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (most clean). From this point, TI includes
several more indicators for understanding the government’s institutions and civil society
of the country. These other indicators include that of the control of corruption, openness
of budget, global competitiveness, judicial independence, rule of law, freedom of the
press, and voice and accountability. More specification allows for a better understanding
of what parts of democratization potentially open the doors to further corruption.
The variable to measure corrupt uses of foreign aid include the USAID and other
international organizational reports that have specifically investigated corruption with
regards to foreign aid distribution and tracking. The study’s measure of corruption is a
descriptive variable of a qualitative analysis from these reports arising from how much of
this aid is being siphoned off. The data is therefore not perfect, but a solid foundational
measure to understanding and tracking elite use of aid funds. The country-specific reports
are similar to the CPI measures in that they focus on perceived corruption within the
society, though they provide uniqueness as well. These focused examinations look at the
society as a whole to determine the multifaceted environment through which foreign aid
is filtered. Depending on the institutions available to track aid inflows, as well as the
perceived governmental commitment to anti-corruption and the ability of citizens to
voice their concern for anti-corruption strategies, these country-specific reports give a
better understanding of the standing environment. The corruption measurements will
focus primarily on the availability and accessibility of aid information to the general
public. This includes the use of aid by the donors; the accessibility constraints including

Ortiz 16
the ability of citizens to connect with internet resources, pay for internet use, and access it
throughout the area; and the potential capacity of citizens to utilize this information based
on understanding of corruption and awareness26. These measures include the institutions
that handle aid distribution such as the Ministry of Finance, and the mechanisms by
which the aid is tracked (i.e. manually or electronically). Reliance on this data along with
the Corruption Perception Index is crucial for targeting corruption at large while also
concentrating on corruption of the foreign aid sector. Corruption will also be evaluated
through the specific aid sectors it is distributed through based on official development
assistance (ODA) sector divisions including education; health and population; other
social infrastructure and services; economic infrastructure; production; multisector;
production; program assistance; action relating to debt; humanitarian aid; and
other/unspecified sectors27.
Research Design
The resulting case studies to compare are that of Ghana, Zambia, and Swaziland.
Africa remains the largest recipient continent of aid, receiving “over $1trn of
international aid over the past 50 years, intended for health care, education infrastructure
and agriculture, among other things”28. This aid primarily consists of long-term
commitments by donor countries to the recipient governments. However, Africa still
holds a disproportionately high amount of the world’s poor and impoverished. This longterm dependency has created an environment where governments “are deprived of their
incentive to carry out essential reforms to attract much-needed investment, spur growth

“Aid Transparency Country Pilot Assessment,” USAID, accessed May 2, 2016,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/AidTransparencyCountryPilotAssessment.pdf.
27
“Aid at a glance by recipient.”
28
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and meaningfully reduce poverty”29. The loss of a sovereignty contract specifically
between African governments and their constituents has had a negative impact on the
economy as well as a significant influence on instances of corruption.
The issues involved with recipient governments and their use of foreign aid is
likewise salient in this continent, as it also has high instances of emerging democracies.
These democracies are said to emerge particularly through the establishment of
democratic elections that are touted as open, free, and fair. However, as the study
attempts to deduce, whether these regime types are authentically democratic or not could
have large consequences for the actual utilization of foreign aid funds.
Given the distinctiveness of African aid, the control variables within this
experiment are drawn from the three recipient governments examined. In each case, the
countries were selected for their levels of development, geographic location, and
historical background. The control for these variables allows for a stronger causality
argument. All three countries represent similar levels of development dependent on HDI
measures from low to middle HDI (0.505-0.63) based on the 2014 index measures30.
Each country from the list of 33 low to middle HDI countries was designated and
controlled for by their location in Africa, as mentioned in the research design. From this
point, each of these African countries at similar HDI levels were chosen based on their
history of colonization – all three having been colonized by the British with similar
colonial reign and gaining independence within ten years of one another, between 1957

Dambisa Moyo, “Does aid work? No says Dambisa Moyo,” 25.
“Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development,” United Nations Development
Programme, accessed March 17, 2016,
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and 1968. The time control allows for more of a handle regarding the literature on
transition democracies versus fully consolidated democracies.
The controlled comparison of these different countries will create an environment
of “most similar” cases, all existing within a specified sub-class, which attempt to be
alike in all aspects except the independent variable31. After conducting the case studies of
each country, initial data was gathered and generalized, broad questions asked regarding
significant corruption indicators and corruption within the foreign aid sector. Since
fieldwork cannot be conducted for each country, proxy data based on historical reports by
major aid distributors will inform the results. The final analysis of data encompasses all
measurements and distinctions between the cases to come to general conclusions and
policy implications.
Case Studies
I.

Ghana
The Corruption Perception Index ranks Ghana as the 61st most corrupt country out

of the 175 countries for which data is available. The country is attributed a score of 48,
indicating that Ghana is more corrupt than it is clean32. Transparency International
gathered data within a span of four years, to investigate the different aspects of Ghanaian
government and society by which corruption can be measured. Ghana’s control of
corruption or the preventative measures taken by the government is in the 60th percentile,
with a score of 0.0889 which shows Ghanaian corruption control is just above the median
level of 0 from -2.5 to 2.5. The Ghanaian budget is more open to public access than not,
though only shows a score of 54 corresponding with “some” in the open budget category.
31
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Ghana is ranked 103rd out of 142 countries measured for global competitiveness with a
score of 3.79/7, making it a relatively low global competitor. Judicial independence is
ranked 59/142 with a score of 4.1/7, just past the median level towards more
independence. Rule of law shows a similar trend of being close to the median, with a
rounded score of -0.0717. The freedom of the press index ranks Ghana as 41st out of 179
countries for which the data is gathered, with a score of 11.00 out of 100. Finally, voice
and accountability is 63 percent, with a score of 0.4937.
Of the three countries examined in this study, Ghana receives the greatest amount
of aid, reaching 1,126.4 USD million as of 2014. The majority of Ghanaian aid this year
was allocated to the social infrastructure and service sector (28 percent), while the health
and population sector runs second at 18 percent and economic infrastructure comes third
at 12 percent33. According to research on the infrastructural projects in Ghana, weak
governance for these projects is seen through “the absence of laid down procedures for
procurement, non-enforcement of laid-down control principles, abuse of managerial
powers, lax supervision, non-existence of codes of conduct, and improper payments and
accounting systems”34. While the Ghanaian government gives infrastructure projects and
the construction industry top priority when it comes to foreign investments, lack of
transparency and accountability leads to corruption within procurement activities of the
projects. The 2003 Public Procurement Act attempted to challenge weaknesses in the

“Aid at a glance by recipient.”
E. Osei-Tutu, E. Badu, D. Owusu-Manu, “Exploring corruption practices in public procurement of
infrastructural projects in Ghana,” International Journal of Managing Projects in Business 3 (2010): 244.
33
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process of carrying out infrastructural projects, though the actualization of this act had
barriers as well35.
Foreign assistance to Ghana can be better understood through a look at its history.
Since 1983, Ghana has seen large implementation of the World Bank’s Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in an attempt to spur growth in GDP for overall
development of the country. However, while this theory formed the foundation of the
World Bank and IMF’s implementation of the programs globally, the resulting growth
benefits were seen more on a macro-level than a micro-level, and development did not
lead to lower levels of inequality36. Since the programs required cuts in public
expenditures, the results were improved GDP paired with much higher levels of societal
inequalities, “While many African economies undergoing structural adjustment may
experience unprecedented socioeconomic growth, judging by standard economic
indicators, they may also experience uneven development, decreasing standards of living,
increasing poverty, and reduced access to basic services”37. With the downsizing of
public services and cutbacks on education, health and welfare, the initial phase of SAPs
resulted in sixty-two percent of funds granted to physical infrastructure while only five
percent was allocated to health and education. With decreased access to health and
education and user fees instituted for these services to be available, inequalities rose
drastically.

Osei-Tutu, Badu, Owusu-Manu, “Exploring corruption practices in public procurement of infrastructural
projects in Ghana.”
36
Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural Adjustment
Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana,” The Professional Geographer 52
(2004).
37
Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural Adjustment Programs and
Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana,” 469.
35

Ortiz 21
Moving past SAPs, macroeconomic stability, and liberalization towards importsubstitution industrialization was the next step for economic growth that Ghana
unfortunately did not have the opportunity to pursue. On the contrary, “their ability to do
so was hindered by two main factors: the return to multiparty rule and the onset of aid
dependence”38. From 1964 to 1992, Ghana saw a period of military rule. When
democratic reforms changed the government in 1992, the success of GDP growth through
the SAPs leading to increase in donor attention, paired with the new political incentive of
high officials to remain in power, took over Ghanaian focus – “After the key architects of
the reforms left the [NDC] government, the reform effort stalled at the liberalisation
stage, and the pursuit of reforms was characterised by less rigour and commitment”39.
Focus on short-term election commitments caused long-term development and economic
reform to take a backseat. When the “medium-term” policy reform “The Goals of Vision
2020” proposed economic, socioeconomic, infrastructure strengthening, and an increased
commitment for providing public sector services was proposed, donors would not back
the changes and the reform saw no actualization. Continued attempts to cater to donor
interests without creating an effective national policy making process characterized the
government moving forward. After years of military rule, Ghana saw a constitutional
revival in 1992, resulting in the current presidential republic with four popular,
contentious parties40.
USAID conducted a pilot assessment of Ghana aid effectiveness in 2014, during
which the Ghanaian government had no mechanism by which aid inflows were tracked
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and monitored. The assessment included information regarding how aid moved from the
initial funding commitment down to the constituent level for project implementation.
Ghana is currently ranked as one of the most advanced African countries for governance
and democratization, and through their involvement with the Open Government
Partnership, a strong public commitment was made by the government for the
transparency of aid inflows41. This partnership included both an Open Data Initiative and
use of the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Ghana saw high levels of functional,
stable, and committed democratic institutions, which are largely accepted and liked by
the public. Further commitments had been made by the Ghanaian government to call for
accountability, transparency, and citizen participation in governance through certain
institutional establishments and processes.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is involved directly with these measures to
increase transparency, but as the USAID report shows, the institutions for aid tracking
still show room for improvement. Initiatives and proposals for a stronger aid tracking
system have been made, though there is currently no strong management system in place.
Information about aid inflows by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are only available
online, while most Ghanaian’s have limited or no access to internet and some reports are
only made available upon request. “In some cases, line ministries undertake separate
efforts to collect information from donors”, such as the Department of Policy, Planning,
Monitoring, and Evaluation, but the primary purpose of this data collection is for internal
uses only42. Means of accessing information on aid flows are complicated by the lack of
access to the Ministry of Finance itself (unless one has personal connections), and an
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underdeveloped media outlet. When asked about how to improve avenues for data access
on aid inflows, key stakeholders from the Ghanaian government identified specifically
some governmental institutions that could potentially improve transparency. Their
conclusions were that information needed to be channeled, “through the Office of the
Auditor General, parliamentary commissions, local offices of the Commission on Human
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), as well as district authorities”43. Likewise,
the capacity of citizens to find, access, understand, and utilize data would improve
governmental accountability and transparency.
II.

Zambia
Zambia, represented as the partially free country by Freedom House measures,

shows corruption levels that correspond with the hypothesis in comparison with that of
Ghana. Zambia is ranked the 85th most corrupt country and given a score of 38, making it
significantly more corrupt than Ghana by about ten points. Control of corruption is 33
percent and given a score of -0.5734, relatively close to the median but likewise
significantly worse than Ghana’s score. This is also the case with the open budget index’s
“minimal” score of 36. However, Zambia and Ghana are ranked just next to each other
for global competitiveness with Zambia at the 102nd place of 142 and a score just .1
below that of Ghana – 3.8/7. Judicial independence is 82/142, scoring a 3.5/7, making the
Zambian judiciary just at the median between entire dependence and complete
independence. Rule of law is 38 percent, with a score of -0.4939. Voice and
accountability is 39 percent with a score of -0.2642. All the above-mentioned corruption
measures align with the hypothesis as a “partially free” country showing higher levels of
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corruption than the “free” country of Ghana. The measure for freedom of the press places
Zambia as 86th of 179 countries and with a score of 3044.
Zambia was the second sub-Saharan African country to emerge as democratic,
electing their first president in 1991, Frederick Chiluba45. Following an authoritarian
regime, Chiluba was a champion of democratic values during the election, though
rampantly engaged in corrupt uses of public money for his private benefit upon gaining
office. The next election nominated Mwanawasa, an unknown and inexperienced lawyer,
“Notwithstanding the baggage of a tainted nomination and election, low levels of trust in
the president and persistent popular concerns about Zambia’s democracy, President
Mwanawasa pledged to combat corruption”46. However, the new government did not
make anti-corruption measures a priority and Mwanawasa was perceived as weak – only
able to win through Chiluba’s influence. In 2006, Zambia attributed about 50 percent of
its national budget to donor financing. Anti-corruption measures and prosecution of
Chiluba was a conditionality strongly tied to that aid, making Zambia one of the only
countries to have actualized persecution of a president based on corruption charges. Like
Ghana, Zambia is a presidential republic, having just elected its sixth president in 201547.
As of 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) distribution of Zambian aid shows the sectors receiving the greatest distribution
of aid is that of the health and population sector, constituting 38 percent of ODA, and
social infrastructure and services at the same percentage. High HIV/AIDs prevalence
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corresponds with the strong focus, especially by the US, for aid to the health sector. The
emphasis of aid on social infrastructure and services can be better understood by
examining the long history of land reform throughout Zambia’s Kaunda regime, soon
after independence. The period of economic socialism and intense nationalism that
followed Zambian independence established a system of central planning and rid the
country of a competitive market for land entirely. It was not until the 1995 Land Act that
new land reform legislation was instituted due to a need for international aid, “Land
market reform was not only an electoral pledge, it was also one of the key conditionalities
that the Zambian government was required to meet in order to restructure its international
debt”48. While the liberalization lessened the state’s hold on undeveloped land and
established institutions that protect leaseholders and customary rights, only Zambian
elites and foreign investors appear to currently hold title to land. This is mostly due to the
lack of knowledge about the changes disseminated to the general population.
Since 2009, Zambia’s reliance on foreign aid has drastically decreased. In 2010,
Zambia received a concessional loan from China to finance infrastructure and would be
about 40 percent of the national budget. Reduced reliance on “traditional partners” after
the loan led to a dramatic decrease in aid dependency, reducing the national budget’s aid
constitution to only about eight percent. Similar investments with non-traditional donors
such as India and Brazil allowed Zambia to continue a similar path towards aid
independence49. With the economic growth seen due to a hike in copper prices, Zambia
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has experienced “booming commodity prices, a relatively stable economy and the
resultant improved credit ratings”50.
Aid transparency has not become a central focus for the Zambian government as
of 2014, and the few moves to increase aid tracking have been abandoned. There is no
formal aid inflow tracking system. However, USAID highlighted some moves that have
been made for furthering objectives, such as donor collaboration. The Ministry of
Finance and Planning, similar to that of Ghana, is the portion of the Zambian government
that tracks aid influx, though this process is done manually and other line ministries
oftentimes overstep the MoF to gather data themselves. Discrepancies that result are left
unresolved, and “the development cooperation portfolio incomplete or piecemeal”51.
Other institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health track aid
inflows through a commitment to transparency by both the Zambian government and
donors – the Mutual Accountability Framework. While this practice of tracking aid
disbursement is a major step towards anti-corruption measures, the procedure is still
imperfect and inefficient with lack of coordination between ministries characterizing the
process – not all information on funding flows are given to the MoF through these other
ministries. Cumbersome, manual processes to track where aid money goes further hinder
institutional attempts to find aid funding misuse, and the spreadsheet of information on
projects, donors, and funding is generally not released to the public. What little
information is released through the annual official report on government expenditures,
“The Blue Book”, does not include all projects but only the highly visible and valuable
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ones. Similar to Ghana, Zambia sees low levels of information given online, paired with a
lack of access to the internet.
USAID and the Zambian government have recognized the need for the public to
hold the process of foreign aid effectiveness to higher standards. Currently, only a couple
NGOs within the country have focused on civil society’s role in monitoring anticorruption measures as well as tracking government spending. Zambian stakeholders
have called on the media to voice the concerns of the Zambian people who are
particularly concerned about the objectives and progress of particular projects through the
use of newspapers, radio, and internet (when accessible). However, there have been
strong restrictions placed on independent civil society organizations, specifically nongovernmental organizations, such as legislation allowing the government to cancel
registration and restrict funding from outside sources. Many press members have voiced
concerns of government restrictions on media outlets and their access to information,
which in turn hinders the dissemination of this information to the public. While the
public’s concern with the availability of information does not necessarily focus
specifically on aid inflows, there is a desire for the government to be held more
accountable. Anti-corruption measures such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)
in Zambia do not focus specifically on the misuse of foreign aid funds, but do require that
the government’s budget remains more open and accessible, especially when looking at
specific public projects52.
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III.

Swaziland
Scoring a 43 and ranked 69th of 175 countries measured, Swaziland is below the

median and more corrupt than not. The absolute monarchy has a 53 percent for the
control of corruption measure and a score relatively close to the median at -0.1592. Of
the three countries analyzed, Swaziland interestingly does not show any measure for the
open budget index, but rather data is unavailable for any year of this Corruption
Perceptions measures. Global competitiveness is very similar to the other two countries
with regards to the score, 3.28/7, though Swaziland’s ranking is much further from both
Zambia and Ghana at 135/142. The independence of the judiciary makes Swaziland 79th
of 142 with a score of 3.6/7, far from Ghana’s score and more towards a stronger
judiciary dependence and influence. Rule of law is 38 percent with a score of -0.4958.
The press freedom index is the worst rank of the three countries examined, ranking
Swaziland as the 144th of 179 countries and scoring a 67. Voice and accountability
likewise show dismal numbers with Swaziland at only the 13th percentile with a score of 1.2680, the closest to full lack of voice and accountability than the other countries
analyzed53.
The OECD break up of foreign aid for Swaziland is drastic, with the highest
percentage (77 percent) of aid going to the health and population sector. The other sectors
remain below ten percent including that of social infrastructure (seven percent) and
education (four percent)54. This is primarily due to Swaziland holding the highest
prevalence of HIV/AIDs in the world and international efforts, particularly by the US, to
combat these levels. Given the shortage and depletion of resources paired with dramatic
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prevalence of HIV/AIDs related deaths, those within Swaziland are seeking jobs and
opportunities elsewhere. This is particularly evident in the health workforce. Swaziland is
witnessing mass departure of health practitioners due to lack of education, work, and
salary. The country has no medical school so students must go abroad in order to receive
a medical degree. Likewise, the loss of nurses due to HIV/AIDs is so severe the output of
new nurses is not enough to compensate for emigration and deaths. The population of
nurses and other health practitioners within Swaziland is mostly foreign55. This reality
makes clear the association of high health and population aid distributed to Swaziland,
though the corruption literature on this foreign aid is more a general statement on the
nature of aid given, rather than specific to Swaziland as a case-study.
Corruption is largely a part of Swazi culture, dominated by the relation of Swazi
citizens to King Mswati III and government officials. In 1973, the standing king
suspended the constitution and banned political parties, continuing with the absolute,
hereditary rule until 2007. Due to pressure from the international community, domestic
pressures, and as a condition for further aid provisions, the country then saw more
movement towards anti-corruption legislation and government participation for increased
transparency. All historic programs had proved unfruitful including the 1993 Prevention
of Corruption Order and the 1998 Anti-Corruption Commission, both institutions that had
weak structure, low administration commitments, and financial leverage. The 2006
program mirrored these previous efforts, responding to international pressures for
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funding, though failing to prosecute or investigate any related parties through
actualization of the process56.
Along with these measures was the implementation of the sector wide approach
where Sector Working Groups (SWGs) would, “provide the forum for policy dialogue
and coordination within and between the government and other stakeholders (including
the donors and non-state actors)”57. This institutional change is a movement within the
monarchy to create institutions and sectors similar to that that of Ghana and Zambia,
within which anti-corruption measures can begin. However as of 2011, the sectors
showed little organization and ability to strategize for development changes. Aid policy
adopted in 1999 essentially split ODA into loans and grants amongst the Ministry of
Finance and other ministries, even with attempts to assist ODA management functions
with the Aid Management and Coordination Section (ACMS). The fragmentation created
many ineffective and complex channels by which the Swazi government coordinates with
donors:
The challenges presented by ACMS in terms of fulfilling its mandate include,
fragmented efforts in resource mobilization, that line ministries initiate and
conclude resource mobilization without involving ACMS, that some donors give
aid to Swaziland without liaising with ACMS, poor coordination and the fact that
there is no holistic picture of how much aid is received by the Kingdom and no
system to properly monitor commitments and disbursements of ODA. Some
development partners tend to liaise directly with the respective central ministries
in accordance with the funding modality i.e. loans or grants. It is also evident that
other ministries are also from time to time negotiating funding loans and grants
directly with development partners.58
Overall, the distribution of aid within Swaziland is largely hindered by the complete lack
of a system to accurately track the spending of donor financing, similar to that of Zambia.
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While aid is largely tied to the conditionality of better governance, Swaziland’s monarch
tends to tout the need for transparency legislation, but lacks actualization of these
promises entirely59. It is worth noting that of the three countries examined, Swaziland is
given a significantly low amount of ODA as a whole, with only 85.9 USD million total
allocated to the area60.
Analysis
Case Study

Ghana

Zambia

Swaziland

Amount of bilateral aid (USD
million)
General Corruption Score (TI)
General Corruption Rank (TI)
Control of Corruption (TI)
Open Budget Index (TI)
Global Competitiveness (TI)
Judicial Independence (TI)
Rule of Law (TI)
Press Freedom Index (TI)
Voice and Accountability (TI)
Main institution(s) to track
distribution

1126.4

994.6

85.9

48
61/175
0.0889
54 (some)
3.79/7
4.1/7
-0.0717
11
0.4937
MoF, line
ministries

43
85/175
-0.5734
36 (minimal)
3.8/7
3.5/7
-0.4939
30
-0.3643
MoF, line
ministries

Automated aid management platform
(as of 2014)
Internet connectivity (% of pop)

No

No

38
69/175
-0.1592
No data
3.28/7
3.6/7
-0.4958
67
-1.2680
MoF (loan
component only),
Sector Working
Groups (SWGs)
No

17%

15.4%

No data

The hard data and measurements provided by Transparency International show
trends and patterns between the three countries in the general ranking and score, and also
for each specific measurement. On the whole, Ghana is ranked and scored as the cleanest
country of the three examined, based on the general corruption measures and the
Corruption Perceptions Index. This means that Ghana’s public sector is perceived to be

“Country Profiles,” BBC News, accessed May 14, 2016,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm.
60
“Aid at a glance by recipient.”
59

Ortiz 32
the cleanest. This comes as no surprise, and appears consistent with the hypothesis,
considering Ghana was ranked as the freest of the three countries through the Freedom
House measures. The institutions that generate Ghanaian democratic society are,
according to Transparency International’s data, stronger and more efficient at combating
corruption than the others examined. Where the data show deviation from the hypothesis
is with Swaziland and Zambia for the general corruption perceptions as well as the
specific data on political rights and civil liberties. Swaziland ranked and scored higher
than Zambia for the general corruption measures, though came closer to Ghana’s ranking
than that of Zambia. This is surprising data considering Swaziland is an absolute
monarchy that shows little use of democratic institutions, while Zambia is considered
democratic and was ranked as partially free for the Freedom House measures.
Each specific corruption measurement shows consistency with the hypothesis
primarily for Ghana – Ghana is ranked more open, free, and fair for six of the seven
analyses. Swaziland and Zambia, however, not only continue to deviate from the
hypothesis, but also show varying trends from one measurement to the next. Control of
corruption places Ghana as governed better by a significantly higher margin (above the
median). Zambia shows the lowest score and therefore the worst governance for
corruption control while Swaziland shows governance more on par with Zambia’s low
number, though slightly better. The open budget index is a bit more challenging to assess
seeing as Transparency International has no data for Swaziland. The reason for this could
be that the country has no budget information available for the public, or that
Transparency International was simply unable to generate any data for other
methodological reasons. That aside, Ghana still shows consistency by having at least

Ortiz 33
some budget openness while Zambia only has minimal. Judicial independence and rule of
law again place Ghana as the most independent and governed the best, respectively.
Swaziland, while having a more independent judiciary than Zambia, is only about .1 off
from Zambia’s score. Their levels of independent judiciary are therefore very similar. For
rule of law, Zambia again comes in last by an insignificant difference from Swaziland
(.002). For these two measurements, Zambia and Swaziland could essentially be ranked
on par with one another. The press freedom index shows a bit more differentiation
between scores. Ghana scores the best with a largely free press while Swaziland is ranked
the worst. Finally, Ghana shows better governance for voice and accountability while
Swaziland shows the worst by a much greater margin than Zambia and Ghana do from
each other. Global competitiveness is the only measure whereby Ghana’s place is shifted.
Zambia is ranked as more competitive globally, with Ghana coming in second and
Swaziland last. However, the numbers for each country are very similar, with less than a
full point between each. On the whole, Ghana shows lower levels of corruption at a
significantly better margin than both Zambia and Swaziland, while Zambia surprisingly
does not rank as high for the different measures as expected given the Freedom House
measurements.
Aside from the hard Transparency International data, corruption also “… needs to
be addressed by demands for reform on a sector-by-sector basis”61. Foreign aid sector
divisions can distinguish the specific areas within which corruption may occur and can be
more appropriately challenged. For the OECD breakdown of foreign aid distribution in
the countries studied, there are four sectors that attracted the largest amounts of ODA –
education; health and population; social infrastructure; and economic infrastructure.
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These sectors are not only focused on for aid distribution, but are likewise widely prone
to corruption without regard to foreign aid62.
The education sector is particularly prone to corruption due to its sentimental
value, various small-scale distribution avenues, and multiple levels of decision-making
bodies. Undermining of the educational system leads to an undermining of overall
development goals and economic progress. Petty corruption in the educational system is
carried out by more local level officials, through acts of bribery, fraud, gift giving,
incompetence, etc. In this sector, it is the central ministry, or the leaders at the top making
important decisions regarding explicit governmental funding that has the potential to
divert funds from both government accounts and international assistance funds. From the
top of the ladder, the effects of corruption trickle down to infiltrate the lower, local
agencies including teachers and their classrooms. The health care sector, which
constitutes even larger portions of assistance, especially in Swaziland with 77 percent of
ODA allocated for HIV/AIDS prevention and other health services, shows similar trends
of hierarchy and potential for funding misuse. Corruption in health is made possible due
in large part to the various avenues of services, procurement, and overall health care
demand. The resulting failure of the sector due to corruption results in bribes, theft, and
inefficient or unethical services, “As health services fail, people end up having to pay
out-of-pocket for services that are supposed to be free, with the burden falling
disproportionately on the poor”63. Larger infrastructural projects, both social and
economic, that are funded by donors through foreign assistance would naturally result in
similar issues. If any sort of project utilizing foreign aid funds was created by the
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government and high officials, the use of the money at lower levels would require
specific accountability measures to ensure effective utilization64.
In each of these sectors, there is a necessity for complex collaboration between
varying levels of government, down to the locals and citizens carrying out the
actualization of each sector project or objective. The much larger issue of government
incompetence within grand corruption is the sort of issue directly affecting how foreign
aid money is spent. Inefficiency and ineptitude at the higher government levels leads to
an inability of lower level officials and locals to appropriately manage sectors.
Oftentimes, the inability of the government to effectively provide services to constituents
requires that the citizens then take measures into their own hands simply in order to
survive and make a living. The perception that corruption is simply a part of society and
culture, resulting from an unchangeable government, creates a sense of acceptance or
attitude that “this is just the way it is”. Grand corruption is then a matter of appropriate
leadership – leaders who “respect the rule of law, emphasize transparency in the
operation of the offices they oversee, take action against subordinates found violating
rules, and exhibit integrity in their own transactions can make a difference”65.
The necessary measure to combat corruption through governmental misuse is for
some form of accountability approach or means by which to track the funds directly as
they work their way through the government to lower levels of society. When
governments have systems in place to track the spending of each grant or loan, siphoning
of this money is more difficult. The Ministry of Finance is one form of institutional
measure mentioned in the data that has the potential to establish a tracking measure and
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was seen in each of the three countries. Still, the caveat with this conclusion is that this
tracking measure requires that the availability of that information to the general public
exists as well. Cumbersome manual processes to track aid inflows were noticed along
with an inadequacy of citizens to understand information, if it is accessible. Low internet
connectivity and high expenses for mobile internet access creates strong restrictions on
availability. Zambia and Swaziland show very obvious restrictions on the obtainability of
this information. Ghana, on the other hand, showed higher levels of transparency and
information availability.
Without government transparency to back accountability measures, there are easy
avenues for elites to continue misuse of public funds, disguised as general anti-corruption
commitments and façade institutions. The differentiation between each country examined
is in the government’s public commitment to tackle the issues at hand along with
actualization of the process. While Zambia showed no significant commitment to
establish anti-corruption measures or for the government to provide accountability
measures, the Ghanaian government did. Swaziland likewise established a commitment,
but the monarchy did not follow through on their promise to actualize anti-corruption
measures. Again, Ghana showed the strongest measures for voice and accountability as
well as freedom of the press. Swaziland and Zambia showed dismal numbers in this
regard. While Swaziland established a commitment to tackle corruption, the country
lacks proper measures for tracking aid inflows and lacks avenues for constituents to
influence governmental policy. Zambia lacks the institution, the public commitment for
action, and necessary influence by its citizens.
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In democracies, the electoral process is an avenue through which citizens can
directly influence the government and establish a significant voice. Therefore, corruption
can be combatted by elections – “…an increase in perceived corruption is effectively
punished by voters in the general election”66, meaning voters will get rid of corrupt elites
rather than re-elect them. Research has also shown that voters express their concerns
regarding corruption more so in parliamentary systems than presidential. However,
Africa in particular, maintains a culture of neopatrimonialism and well-established
patron-client relationships, so elections become another avenue for elites to assert their
control. Ghana shows evidence of officials abusing their status in light of the 1992
democratic revival – the existence of competitive democratic elections only resulted in
continued violation or disagreement on rules of conduct, creating an atmosphere of
patronage that was characterized by violence and coercion67. As with many other African
elections, the disguise of democratic elections acted as another platform for elites to
assert their control and mute the voices of their constituents:
Therefore, contests among rival political groups for access to, and control of,
public office have caused electoral politics to degenerate into fierce ‘all or zero
sum’ games, thereby making the electoral process and the elections little more
than state-sanctioned power struggles between competing leaders or factions.68
Rather than elections solving political crises and supporting true democratic values, they
simply became measures to gain donor support for regime change, and increased
competition amongst officials for political power. Zambia shows significant evidence of
clientelism in their voting process, meaning a mutual benefit can be accrued from private
Stefan Krause and Fabio Méndez, “Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross-Section
of Countries,” Economics and Politics 21 (2009), 195.
67
Emmanual Debrah, “The electoral process and the 2000 general elections in Ghana,” In Liberal
Democracy and Its Critics in Africa, edited by Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, 125-144. (Dakar: Codestria
Books, 2005).
68
Emmanual Debrah, “The electoral process and the 2000 general elections in Ghana,” 143.
66

Ortiz 38
benefits in exchange for political loyalty. However, the direct exchange of these benefits
need not be required for clientelism to take place:
An intermediate form of clientelism would involve a hierarchy starting with elites
who have access to government funds. These elites then filter the funds through
more local intermediaries, and thus this form of clientelism would similarly not
rely on direct, personal exchanges.69
In the political environments of each country, the connection elites have to their
constituencies as a whole is minimal at most. Voters are more likely to vote for
politicians that encourage development projects and public use of money, rather than
private gain. Yet, the danger of this understanding is, again, that the ability of the
electoral process to hinder corruption relies upon the constituents’ knowledge that
corruption exists in the first place. “Pervasive narrowness of the political arena, the subtle
means by which the press is intimated and subdued, and the variety of tactics incumbents
use to manipulate electoral process and delegitimize the opposition,”70 so that political
insiders are rewarded, while regular citizens are ignored.
Conclusions
High levels of democratization are inversely related to levels of corruption in
foreign aid usage. Low levels of foreign aid corruption then can result in increased
effectiveness of development interventions and therefore increased overall development.
However, this research likewise concludes that the initial hypothesis on foreign aid
corruption and democracy correlations is incomplete. This study shows that democratic
institutions are not the only thing influencing the prevalence of corruption within certain
societies – there are a large number of other factors that create a breeding ground for the
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misuse of public funds. Democratization cannot be divorced from foreign aid, however as
necessary as democracy is to foreign aid usage, it is not a sufficient condition.
Indistinguishable from the need to have democratic structures such as open, free, and fair
elections, is an understanding the constituents’ desire to reduce corruption within society
and the ability of citizens to connect with their leaders through their own voice. This all
culminates around the relationship created by the existence of a sovereignty contract,
whereby government remains responsive and dependent upon their constituents and the
constituents likewise provide the government with legitimacy. This being understood, the
hypothesis is correct in that an increase in the level of democracy creates positive
externalities for the effectiveness of aid distribution and overall development. Ghana,
which comparatively holds more effective democratic institutions, likewise saw lower
levels of corruption. Zambia and Swaziland, lacking not only the institutional strength but
also constituent influence, saw higher levels of corruption. The hypothesis is then
incomplete given the nuances of Zambian and Swazi constituent commitment to anticorruption and availability of information.
Foreign aid delivered with conditionalities such as policy and regime changes
need change the definition of “good governance” or “democracy”. It is apparent that
democracy exists in varying levels dependent upon the presence and implementation of
civil liberties and political rights. While many African countries publicly declare
themselves democratic, the violation of citizens’ rights and control by the government
creates an environment that could hardly be labeled liberal. Over time:
’More years of uninterrupted democracy should tend to reduce corruption’. Thus,
‘in established democracies, where such norms [about public responsibility and
accountability] are strong, people will regard corrupt practices as improper and
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illegitimate’, although ‘openness and accountability will not reduce corruption
unless [and until] existing social norms condemn it’71.
Yet, established democracies present challenges themselves. Long-term presence of
democracy could reduce voter turn out, lowering the influence civil society has over high
officials. Newly emerged democracies typically have larger voter turnout and
participation.72 Studies have shown that even successful democracies established over a
significant period have a high prevalence of corruption.
To properly address the inconsistencies present within nominal democratic
regimes, donors must prioritize and strategize the most effective conditions to require for
tied aid. According to this study, those measures could be monitored by the presence of a
tracking system by the Ministry of Finance, a significant institution to create free press or
voice within civil society, or electoral changes to ensure truly competitive elections.
Another way to perhaps ensure the equitable distribution of funds could lie in the sector
differentiations as divided by the OECD. While corruption does not stay limited to one
sector, using this approach in anti-corruption strategies has potential to generate more
transparency and accountability73. Dividing anti-corruption measures into smaller
portions places responsibility on the sectoral leaders through a commission or agency that
can establish a clear, productive, efficient means to change. Likewise, placing
constituents that are not members of the governmental elite in charge of public fund
distribution has the potential to limit elite misuse.
Moving forward with this information and understanding what measures
potentially hinder the prevalence of corrupt foreign aid use, policy recommendations
Taylor, “Divergent Politico-Legal Responses to Past Presidential Corruption in Zambia and Kenya:
catching the ‘big fish’, or letting him off the hook?” 283.
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could accompany bilateral aid to ensure donor and constituent interests are maintained in
the distribution process. First, the creation of a database such as the UNDP mandated in
Swaziland could have strong potential to change the process of aid tracking. With a
manageable, user-friendly, all-encompassing mechanism to input sector-based projects
and consistently manage the projects, the money could be better tracked. However,
creation of a database must also address the internet accessibility issue present within
each of these countries. Therefore, donor commitments and project specific information
must be made readily available to constituents through varying mediums. While the
internet must act as one avenue for information dissemination, printed issues need be
included as well. Even small changes to the giving of specific grants and loans will create
a stronger tracking mechanism that is solely for the use of the public. Once this
information is made easily accessible, demand for government accountability and
transparency will be stronger.
The fluidity of corruption definitions inevitably means that the practice has many
dimensions that make recognition of the larger issue more difficult. The Transparency
International corruption measures are solely based on the public’s perception of how
corrupt their government is. For a society, such as Swaziland, that perpetuates corrupt
practices as a social norm, the perceived corruption could be much lower than the amount
of corrupt exchanges and relationships. Those who believe corrupt practices are simply a
way of life, those who have never been exposed to fair transactions, would perhaps not
consider anti-corruption a major concern. For anti-corruption policy to be effective, and
for donor funds to create development, the public need be informed of the larger issue. It
is important to consider this when looking at the study’s results as well as other factors
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that influenced the data – reliance on proxy data may provide limitations that actual
fieldwork might not.
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Appendix on Faith and Learning
In my life, I have been situated between two extreme ways of thinking that
exemplify the division between those with faith and those without. The religious
foundations of this Christian university have challenged my experience as a non-believer,
alongside a now secular family. Yet, my time at Seattle Pacific has not been polarizing.
There is diversity of thought from within the Christian tradition that I grew to understand.
I have come to respect those who believe, while I would hope they respect my pursuit of
understanding. Having spent the last three years as a minority by way of faith has deeply
affected how I have committed to live my life.
“If one believes that our species is no more than what has so far evolved, there is
hardly a convincing basis for treating all people as having equal rights or for special
concerns for the weak and the disadvantaged.”74 On the contrary to this sort of exclusive
language, I believe being situated outside of religion and still committing to moral
behaviors is deeply important and possible. Attending SPU has opened my mind more
about the Christian tradition than I felt possible. I found myself deeply committed to
understanding this world I sat only at the edge of. Recently, a fellow University Scholar
voiced his admiration for my having stuck with the program seeing how he knew I held
no religious beliefs. This comment struck me deeply. I continued with the program out of
sheer curiosity, sheer desire to understand something drastically differently from a faith
perspective and in other disciplines outside my knowledge. I believe scholarship is a
commitment to this desire for understanding, “The primary task of scholarship is to ‘pay
attention’ to the world – or at least, to some part of the world – with a sense of focus,
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care, and intensity that non-scholars lack”75. However, scholarship does not end here, but
rather continues to be a multidimensional pursuit of understanding – “Scholars also
reflect on the different ways they pay attention to the world; they are methodologically
self-conscious”. I believe the ability to entertain a thought and to be curious without
devoting oneself to that belief is a testament to true scholarship. There is a sort of moral
basis in this as well. Respect and admiration for those who are different is essential. This
is the devoting of oneself to equality and open-mindedness both within a scholarship
setting and without. My ethical commitments concern fairness and equal opportunity for
anyone to voice their opinions. I hope to respect all who cross my path, regardless of their
faith background, socioeconomic status, culture, race, or ethnicity.
This desire for equality has translated into my own discipline. It is essential for
me to understand those around the world who perhaps do not have the freedoms or
equalities that we, in the Western world, enjoy. The rights to have clean water, food,
healthcare, freedom of expression, and equality drive my own scholarship and my life.
International Affairs as a discipline allows me to examine not only the developmental
aspects of other countries, but also opens my eyes to the necessary political institutions
that essentially provide, or should provide, for their citizens. I believe through the
understanding of governmental relationships, country histories, and cultural differences,
equal opportunities can be obtained.
Tracy Kidder’s Mountains Beyond Mountains has been one of the most influential
pieces of literature for understanding who I am. Paul Farmer’s approach to helping those
in Haiti and around the world is one of the most striking and inspiring stories to be read.
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In many ways, his story speaks to me. Raised Catholic, Farmer identifies with some
aspects of his religious background though is not an avid practitioner of the faith. On the
contrary, his commitments are to the poor, the dying, and the suffering. His story is a true
testament to the pursuit of equality. However, one could argue against his approach. Does
Farmer’s role as an “absent” father undermine the goodness of his altruism? Does his
lack of worship change the fact that he has single-handedly saved hundreds of lives? I
would say absolutely not. The commitment Farmer has made is for the greater good and
while humans cannot be perfect, his use of scholarship and morality have done wonders
for many people. My scholarship includes an intense focus on some part of the world,
though the creativity, self-expression, and hard work required of scholarship involves
acting upon that which I have learned. In my life and my discipline, the knowledge I gain
will be utilized to act and help those around me. Farmer exemplifies this as well. Having
done his academic work at Harvard, his actions, utilizing this knowledge, are what have
saved lives and inspired the world. Farmer stewards his own gifts for the benefit of
others. His focus revolves around the greater good and he is willing to sacrifice some
niceties in order to pursue his passions. I would argue this is the deepest commitment to
morality possible.
The nuances of my belief will never be worked out nicely. However, I intend to
continue pursuing further understanding in order to know the person I inherently am. My
discipline, scholarship, and further life paths will hopefully aid in this understanding. I
hope that my commitment to understanding and equality will only increase in time and
further experience. What my past and current situation has taught me is that regardless of
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whom we attribute our existence or our morality, “we’re all human beings”76 and it is our
duty to utilize this understanding of equality to face the problems of the world.
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